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CASE COMMENTS

FAMILY LAW: WELFARE OF THE CHILD, PARENTAL
PREFERENCE, AND THE CONSTITUTION
Painterv. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966)
Harold Painter had temporarily placed his seven-year-old son,
Mark, in the care of his wife's parents following an automobile accident in which both his wife and daughter were killed. Sixteen
months later Painter remarried and asked for his son's return, but
the grandparents refused his request. As plaintiff, he brought habeas
corpus action and was awarded custody by the Iowa district court.
On appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court great emphasis was placed on
the testimony of a child psychologist that Mark would probably "go
wrong" if returned to his father. The court conceded there was no
suggestion in the record that Painter was an unfit parent, but conduded that his was a "Bohemian approach to finances and life in
general." HELD, the emotional welfare of the child would be jeopardized if he were returned to his father's custody. Judgment reversed.
In any custody dispute the child's welfare is of major concern in
determining which contestant will prevail. As the "welfare of the
child" doctrine has evolved it has assumed fresh dimensions. Formerly,
most courts: determined what was best for the child's welfare by
evaluating the respective parent's ability to provide for the health,
safety, education, comfort, and future happiness of the child. As the
behavioral sciences have emerged, however, courts have placed increasing emphasis' on concepts of child psychic development and
are becoming more responsive to the suggestion that a child's welfare
will be furthered if the court directs its attention to the utilization of
such concepts. 2 Therefore, a custody decision does not end with a
consideration of objective qualities of parental fitness, but the court
now must frequently take into account the contesting parent's ability
to serve adequately the child's particularized set of emotional needs.
Thus, one parent may be more "fit" by conventional standards, but
the other parent, in view of the child's emotional demands, may be
able to provide a more favorable climate for the child's psychic adjustment. With the aid of psychoanalytic expert testimony, courts
are able to make a more penetrating analysis of custody problems and,
consequently, the welfare of the child doctrine has become a more
realistic formulation.
It is clear that "welfare of the child" can be valuable in a custody
decision when properly applied. However, Painter's use of the doc1. See, e.g., Payne v. Payne, 218 Ala. 330, 381, 118 So. 575, 576 (1928); Chance
v. Pigneguy, 212 Ky. 430, 279 S.W. 640 (1926).
2. See Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Application of Mittenthal,
37 Misc. 2d 502, 235 N.Y.S.2d 729 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1962).
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trine is open to question in view of the relationship of the contesting
parties to the child. The welfare doctrine has most often been ap3
plied by courts when both contestants were the natural parents.
When a natural parent and a nonparent are contesting, the natural
parent's right is superior unless the nonparent overcomes a rebuttable
presumption of fitness in the parent.4 The presumption may also
be overcome by a showing that the parent deserted or forfeited the
child or that "special circumstances" 5 exist, which would defeat the
parent's natural right. This defeasible right of a parent to his child
is termed the doctrine of "parental preference." Reasons that might
persuade a court to prefer one parent over another parent in the
name of the child's "welfare" will not suffice to deprive a parent of
his child in favor of a stranger,6 even if a relative. The "parental
preference" right is similar to a "trust" 7 reposed in the parent by the
state, which remains undisturbed as long as the parent adequately
ministers to the child's basic needs. If the "trust" is breached and the
parent proved unworthy, the state may intervene as parens patriae
for the child's own protection.
The manner in which the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the lower
court in Painter was remarkable. The decision to overrule the trial
judge was, in itself, an unusual one because equity judges customarily
exercise broad discretionary powers when dealing with family relations problems, and are rarely reversed on appeal.8 The trial judge
3. E.g., Bonnett ex rel. Newmeyer v. Bonnett, 61 Iowa 199, 16 N.W. 91, 93
(1883); Singewald v. Singewald, 165 Md. 136, 166 At. 441, 446 (Ct. App. 1933);
Day v. Day, 4 Misc. Rep. 235, 24 N.Y. Supp. 873 (Super. N.Y. 1893); GELLHORN,
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEw YoRi
CITY 305 (1954).
4. State ex rel. Nelson v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 545, 75 N.W.2d 786, 792
(1956); State ex rel. Cochrane v. Blanco, 177 Neb. 149, 155, 128 N.W.2d 615, 619
(1964); Comment, 14 SvPAcuSE L. REv. 679 (1963).
5. "Special circumstances" is used in a situation in which a fit parent has
never forfeited the child but has indicated, by his behavior, indifference to the
child's well-being. Tucker v. Tucker, 207 Ark. 359, 365, 180 S.W.2d 571, 574 (1944).
6. "Opinions written in divorce suits, where the only issue before the court
was the welfare of children, are not necessarily relevant authority in a custody
contest between a parent and a third party. The best interest of the child may
indeed be a relevant factor in the ultimate decision, but this factor must be considered in a very different light when only one of the litigants comes into court
with the natural rights of parenthood on his side of the case." Parmele v.
Mathews, 233 Ore. 616, 624, 379 P.2d 869, 873 (1963). Accord, Lovell v. House of

the Good Shepherd, 9 Wash. 419, 422, 37 Pac. 660, 661 (1894);

GELLHORN, op. cit.

supra note 3.
7. E.g., Hickey v. Bell, 391 P.2d 447, 448 (Alaska 1964); State ex rel. Cochrane
v. Blanco, 177 Neb. 149, 128 N.W.2d 615 (1964); Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64,
81, 26 A.2d 799, 809 (1942).
8. The trial judge is considered to be in a superior position. "[He] faces the
parties and the witnesses, observes their demeanors and personalities, and feels
the forces, powers and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the
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concluded that testimony offered by the psychologist, Dr. Hawks,
could not be accepted at face value "because of exaggerated statements and the witness's attitude on the stand." The supreme court,
conversely, based its entire decision to reverse on this previously rejected testimony. Dr. Hawks and Mr. Bannister were both employed
at Iowa State University where Bannister was agricultural editor for
the University Extension Service. The supreme court did not feel
that this relationship raised any doubt as to the credibility of Hawk's
testimony.
The Iowa court weighed the fact that Painter's wife had, by will,
named her husband guardian of her children and noted that the
Bannisters were sixty years old. 9 It conceded that Painter merely
intended the Bannisters' custody to be temporary and expressly
pointed out there was nothing in the record to indicate that Painter
was unfit. In addition, it recognized the opinion of a psychiatrist,
who served as a witness for the Bannisters, that upon examination of
Painter he could find no psychiatric instability. Much of the
opinion was devoted to contrasting Painter's "Bohemian" approach
to life with the Bannisters' conservative and middle-class values.-0
It was not in Painter's favor that his house was unpainted, his lawn
uncut, his politics liberal, and his religious training unorthodox. The
supreme court cited these facts, among others, to illustrate an unstable
existence, explaining that this was not to criticize Painter's sense of
values but rather to demonstrate the kind of life to which Mark
would be exposed if he were returned to his father. "[lit would be
unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually
stimulating."' 1
The most significant aspect of the Painteropinion was the manner
in which the court treated "parental preference." It recognized that
the doctrine exists in Iowa, by statute, though "weakened" in the
past several years. The court did not specify how "parental preference" was weakened, but it must be concluded from the opinion
that the welfare doctrine had devitalized it. Iowa's view of "parental
preference" is typically expressed in the following language: "[The]
right of a surviving parent [to his child] is an absolute one, unless
record." Silva v. Aranda, 223 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). Accord, Vanden
Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 1400, 121 N.W.2d 216, 221 (1963).
9. "Care of young children is a strain on grandparents and Mrs. Bannister's
letters indicate as much." Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa 1966).
10. "The Bannister home provides Mark with a stable, dependable, conventional,
middleclass, middlewest background and an opportunity for a college education and
profession, if he desires it." Painter v. Bannister, supra note 9, at 154.
11. Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa 1966). "We believe
security and stability in the home are more important than intellectual stimulation
in the proper development of a child." Painter v, Dqannister, supra.
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it has been relinquished by abandonment, contract, or otherwise, or
unless the best interest and welfare of the child call for other care
and custody."1 2 It is seen, then, that Iowa treats "welfare of the child"
as a concurrent formula to be balanced against the right of a parent
to have his child. Iowa is one of a small number of states, including
Florida,13 which do not consider their role of parens patriae as
qualified by a prior showing of the parent's unworthiness or incapability. In other words, the "trust" of child custody, reposed in the
parent, is revocable at the will of the omnipresent state acting in the
child's best interest and welfare. When the subjective standard of
the child's psychic development is added to the "welfare" formulation,
these states then have the power to take a child away from its natural
parent if a court decides that, although the parent is reasonably fit,
the child's emotional welfare will be hindered by the relationship.
14
This is precisely what happened in Painter, for the first time.
It is important to determine whether "parental preference" is
based on judicial discretion, a legal right, or a constitutional right,
because this decision has a bearing on the question of how freely
courts may disregard it. Even though the Constitution does not
specifically mention the right of a parent to his child, it does not
follow that the right is not constitutionally protected. The United
States Supreme Court recognized in Griswold v. Connecticuts that
the framers drafted the ninth amendment in order to acknowledge
that rights, other than those enumerated in the Bill of Rights, were
in existence and were intended to remain free from governmental interference. "The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes
that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the
rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of
similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights [Bill of
Rights] specifically protected."16 In Meyer v. Nebraska7 the Court
12. Wooly v. Schoop, 234 Iowa 657, 660, 12 N.W.2d 597, 598 (1944). Accord,
Kouris v. Lunn, 136 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Iowa 1965).
13. E.g., Hancock v. Dupree, 100 Fla. 617, 129 So. 822 (1930); State ex rel.

Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1957); Morris v. Kridel, 186 So. 2d 52 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
14. A recent opinion of a New York court similarly denied custody of a child
by terming "fitness" a relative concept. The mother might have been fit to care
for an ordinary child but she was not fit from the viewpoint of her son's emotional

needs. This court used "fitness" where Painter used "welfare of the child," but
both employed the subjective test of emotional development to achieve the same
result. Application of Mittenthal, 37 Misc. 2d 502, 235 N.Y.S.2d 729 (N.Y. Fain.

Ct. 1962).
15. 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965).
16. Id. at 495. (Mr. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion joined by Mr.
Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan.)
17. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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indicated that "liberty" was not to be given a constrained meaning in
interpreting the fourteenth amendment. "Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual... to marry, establish a home and bring up children .... ,,18
Pierce v. Society of Sisters'9 is another example of the Court's endorsement of "the liberty of parents... to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control."20 A state statute was held
invalid as an unreasonable interference with that right. Mr. Justice
Douglas, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,21 again recognized family cohesiveness by saying the liberty of an individual to marry and to
have children is "one of the basic civil rights of man." 22 With this
line of cases in mind, it is suggested that the right of a parent to his
child is one of those "fundamental" liberties protected by the
fourteenth amendment from undue state interference. The Supreme
Court will, as Griswold demonstrates, strike down state action that
23
interferes with "fundamental" liberties protected by due process.
If the right to have one's child is constitutionally grounded, as the
Court has indicated, then "parental preference" cannot be weighed
as merely one element to be considered when determining custody,
nor can it be discarded by more sophisticated notions of "welfare
of the child." The Supreme Court has succinctly placed in constitutional perspective the relationship between state, parent, and
24
child:
It is cardinal with us that custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.... And it is in recognition of this
that these decisions have respected the private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter.
When state powers of parens patriae are exercised to remove a
child from his natural parent in favor of a nonparent, there must
be overwhelming proof of necessity. "Parental preference" is similar
to a condition precedent; unless the constitutionally protected "trust"
is breached by the parent's unworthiness or incapability, the state has
18. Id. at 399.
19. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
20. Id. at 534.

21. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
22. Id. at 541.
23. See Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. R.v. 235, 249 (1965); cf. Red-

lich, Are There Certain Rights Retained by the People?, 37 N.Y.UJ.,. Ra,. 787, 810
(1962).
24. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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no authority to deprive him of his child by using "welfare" as the
only justification for its action.25 This formulation of parens patriae,
constrained as it is by parental preference, has appeared antiquated
to critics who have repeated the thought that the child is not a
chattel in which the parent has a property interest.26 Although such
criticism elicits an emotive reaction, it ignores the purpose that
"parental preference" serves. The doctrine, in a contemporary setting,
merely recognizes the value that a free society places on intimate
family relationships, with a minimum of governmental controls.
In Painter the presumption was never rebutted; the Iowa court
never overcame the substantive protections of "parental preference."
Painter and the Bannisters were treated as if they were equally entitled to the child with Painter's right to his son as merely one of
many considerations to be weighed by the court. Conceding for the
moment that Mark Painter's welfare might have been advanced by the
court's decision, it does not necessarily follow that society's welfare
has benefited. It is disturbing that, at a time when government is
becoming more pervasive in every facet of human activity, the Painter
decision has chosen to denature the rights of parenthood with such an
exacting standard of supervisory control. To penalize deviation
from the norm with a standard as illusory as "psychological welfare"
is unsupportable in the face of the realization that these rights find
their basic support and protection in the Constitution itself. Those
who wish to preserve family cohesiveness from the omnipotence of
government must regret this undiscerning opinion of the Iowa
Supreme Court.
JOHN

25. See, e.g., Bell v. Leonard, 251 F.2d 890, 895
Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 571, 188 N.W. 618, 617 (1922).

F. FANNIN

(D.C. Cir. 1958); Lacher v.

26. Jackson v. Jackson, 164 Kan. 891, 190 P.2d 426, 439 (1948); In re Hogue,
41 N.M. 438, 70 P.2d 764, 766 (1937); Commonwealth v. Teitelbaum, 160 Pa.
Super. 286, 50 A.2d 713, 715 (1947). At common law, custody of one's child was
considered analogous to a valuable property interest; therefore, Painter's right to
have custody of his son would have been unquestioned. E.g., Commonwealth v.
Murray, 4 Binn, 487, 498, 5 Am. Dec. 412, 415 (Pa. 1812). "The father is entitled to the services of his sons . . . but however strange it may appear, the
mother has no such right."
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